Over 10 Questions for Digital ID Card Advocates
The UK is now heading towards compulsory Digital IDs, here's why it could be a terrible decision.
Is the government happy to build new and centralised databases with a significant amount of personal data and, if so, at what cost?
Given past hacks and cyber-attacks (link), would the government admit that the project would immediately go on the National Risk Register?
How would enrolment and registration work?
Would the whole project impact trust in the government (especially amongst minority groups)?
Digital ID advocates claim, like a magical policy wand, it will help solve all manner of issues, including immigration. But why not make the existing systems work? As just one example, the past independent chief inspector of borders and immigration pointed out several flaws until the last government fired him (link).
We already have ID cards (passports, driving licences and so on) so why create another level of government infrastructure and a stealth tax on citizens?
Rural broadband (and the lack of it) is still an issue (link). Other adults don’t have smartphones. Will these people be excluded from society?
How would digital ID enforcement work and who would carry it out, the police?
What budget would a government give the NHS to help cope with the transition to digital ID?
How, practically, would you unify the DVLA, Passport Office and National Insurance databases?
How would the collected data be shared? How many functions/apps would the Digital ID have?
Overall, how would a Digital ID project not become a large IT infrastructure that runs over time, runs over budget and undermines public trust?
Further Reading:
Is The Surveillance State Just Lazy? (link)
Ross Anderson’s past evidence to the UK Parliament on Digital IDs (link)
A media report of the UK Prime Minister’s trailed speech (link)
UK Parliament: Cyber resilience of UK digital infrastructure (link)
A 2005 House of Commons Technology Select Committee report on Digital IDs (link)